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ABSTRACT 
The public trust doctrine in America derives from common law, and 
each new state became the trustee following independence. The public 
trust doctrine gives the state the right to sue for natural resource 
damage, among other things. To prevail, the state need show only 
(1) a protectable public trust interest, (2) unreasonable interference,
and (3) a nexus between that interference and a loss to that protected
interest. The case law, however, reflects confusion or imprecision
about a number of matters. First, courts and advocates often talk about
the trustee proving, say, a public nuisance cause of action. My
argument is that proof of public nuisance, or other common law causes,
goes to demonstrating—among other proofs—the unreasonableness of
the interference. Tortious interference with the public trust is neither
derivative to nor dependent on other causes of action. Second, courts
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and advocates often comingle the public trust doctrine and the distinct 
parens patriae doctrine, which are different. Under parens patriae, the 
state proves a separate tort claim, such as public nuisance or trespass. 
Public trust is a standalone claim. Third, although courts understand 
that the public trust doctrine evolves in light of the changing public 
interest, they sometimes focus on what has been done in prior cases 
instead of what needs to be done now to maintain the dynamic nature 
of the public trust. 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
ortious inference with the public trust has always been actionable 
under state law as a substantive right of the state trustee in its 
fiduciary capacity suing on behalf of the public for injury or 
impairment to natural resources belonging to the people.1 That right 
arose “when the [American] revolution took place,” and the thirteen 
colonies won their independence, thus making King George transfer 
the trusteeship to the thirteen colonies at the conclusion of the 
Revolutionary War, not upon ratification of the Constitution.2  
Two things are tricky with the public trust doctrine, and that is what 
this Article addresses. First, what is the subject matter of the public 
trust and how should it evolve? Second, what tools are available to the 
trustee to protect the public trust? Most state public trust doctrines at 
least provide that the tidelands and lands beneath tidal and navigable 
waters are held in trust by the state to promote the public interest.3 
Navigation, commerce, and fishing were originally seen as serving the 
public interest.4 But a lot has changed since colonial times, and our 
conception of the public interest has evolved to include values like 
1 Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae and the Attorney General as 
the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENV’T L. POL’Y F. 57, 111 (2005) 
[hereinafter Kanner, Public Trust].  
2 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842). This is true of the original 
thirteen colonies. Later-admitted states received title to land from the federal government 
but should enjoy “equal footing” to the original thirteen states. States own title to the 
riverbed of their navigable waters as “an essential attribute of sovereignty.” Idaho v. Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997) (quoting Utah Div. of State Lands v. 
United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987)). The source of title determines the law that governs 
the scope of that title. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). 
3 See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 
(N.J. 1972). 
4 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 119 (2005) 
(history of public trust doctrine); Barton H. Thompson Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: 
A Conservative Reconstruction & Defense, 15 SE. ENV’T L.J. 47, 67–68 (2006).  
T 
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recreation, preservation, and restoration of natural resources. The 
public trust doctrine protects the public interest even in the face of 
private property rights: 
The law we are asked to interpret in this case—the public trust 
doctrine—derives from the English common law principle that all of 
the land covered by tidal waters belongs to the sovereign held in trust 
for the people to use. That common law principle, in turn, has roots 
in Roman jurisprudence, which held that “[b]y the law of nature[,] 
. . . the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the 
sea,” were “common to mankind.” . . . No one was forbidden access 
to the sea, and everyone could use the seashore “to dry his nets there, 
and haul them from the sea. . . .” The seashore was not private 
property, but “subject to the same law as the sea itself, and the sand 
or ground beneath it.” In Arnold v. Mundy, the first case to affirm and 
reformulate the public trust doctrine in New Jersey, the Court 
explained that upon the Colonies’ victory in the Revolutionary War, 
the English sovereign’s rights to the tidal waters “became vested in 
the people of New Jersey as the sovereign of the country, and are now 
in their hands.”5 Arnold, addressed the plaintiff’s claim to an oyster 
bed in the Raritan River adjacent to his farm in Perth Amboy. Chief 
Justice Kirkpatrick found that the land on which water ebbs and 
flows, including the land between the high and low water, belongs 
not to the owners of the lands adjacent to the water, but to the State, 
“to be held, protected, and regulated for the common use and 
benefit.”6 
This is an exciting time in the development of the public trust 
doctrine. Courts are more frequently recognizing a standalone public 
trust action7 or natural resource damages action,8 empowering trustees 
to protect the public interest by undoing decades of pollution. These 
recent developments have built on earlier cases9 and portend future 
developments.10 
5 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821). 
6 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n, 879 A.2d at 119. 
7 State v. Hess Corp., 20 A.3d 212, 217, 221 (N.H. 2011); Rhode Island v. Atlantic 
Richfield, 357 F. Supp. 3d 129, 144 (D.R.I. 2018) (MTBE); N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot. v. Deull 
Fuel, No. ATL-L-1839-18 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Aug. 8, 2019); N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot. v. 
ExxonMobil, No. GLO-L-000297-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Feb. 14, 2020) (PCB); State 
v. Monsanto, No. 18-cv-00540 at 17 (D. Or. 2017) (PCB).
8 State v. 3M, Dkt. No. 547-6-19 Cncv, 2 (Chittenden Cnty. Super. Ct., May 28, 2020)
(Order, Toor, J.) (PFAS). 
9 See generally In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980) (migratory 
birds); State v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (fisheries habitat); State v. City 
of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1974); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 
(Wis. 1972); State v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).  
10 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (HORNBOOK) 176 (1977 & Supp. 
1984) (stating that the public trust “can be invoked offensively by the government as in a 
suit to collect damages to trust property”). 
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II 
PUBLIC TRUST 
Most courts today acknowledge that the public trust must be 
allowed to evolve to meet changing conceptions of the public interest,11 
such as recreation,12 ecological management and restoration,13 and 
environmental justice.14 States have the right to protect and manage the 
water,15 air, and land16 over which they are trustees to advance the 
public interest. The doctrine itself “imposes duties on government[,] 
instills certain inalienable rights in the people[, and] . . . constitutes the 
sovereign legal obligation that facilitates the reproduction and survival 
of our society. . . .”17 Under the public trust doctrine, citizens stand as 
beneficiaries, holding public property interests in these essential 
natural resources. The public trust significantly demarcates a society of 
“citizens rather than of serfs.”18 Today, the public interest is generally 
seen to encompass a broader range of interests expanding the trustee’s 
duties.19 The tools available to protect the public trust should be 
clarified and improved. In states with a narrower judicial definition of 
the public trust doctrine, the state as trustee often sues as parens patriae 
in its quasi-sovereign capacity to protect public health, safety, and the 
environment.20 Other states prefer to sue directly for interference with 
11 State v. Cent. Vt. Railway, 571 A.2d 1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989). 
12 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 119 (N.J. 2005). 
13 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1907). 
14 MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW 
ECONOMICAL AGE xviii (2013). 
15 State v. Hess Corp., 20 A.3d 212, 217 (N.J. 2011); State v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 
F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (D. Md. 1972).
16 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (“the state has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain.”).  
17 Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 283 (2014). 
18 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 484 (1970).  
19 See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 
1972) (public interest extends to recreational activities).  
20 Kanner, Public Trust, supra note 1 at 111–12. The states have also developed various 
protections for public use of waters. These use protections often cover waters that are not 
owned by the state under the state’s public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Brosnan v. Gage, 133 
N.E. 622, 624 (Mass. 1921) (public has right of passage for commercial and pleasure craft 
on nontidal navigable streams not subject to state ownership); Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. 
v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 359–60 (Mass. 1979) (public can access private land
between low-tide and high-tide line, even though private property extends to low-tide
marker); Pierson v. Coffey, 706 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (public has right to
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the public trust.21 States may even sue in their proprietary capacity 
where they own the natural resource, such as water bottoms. Although 
there are clear differences among suits to protect the public trust as 
parens patriae or in a proprietary capacity, advocates and judges often 
muddle their reasoning, comingling, say, public trust language and 
parens patriae language. Because there are limits to the reach of parens 
patriae, it is important to skip the verbiage and focus on the substantive 
content of common law public trust claims.22 
The term “public trust” refers to a fundamental understanding that 
“we the people” share equally in certain natural resources, that private 
property rights are limited by the public’s interest in certain natural 
resources, that government must protect the public as a fiduciary, and 
that no legislature may legitimately abdicate its core sovereign 
responsibility by undermining the public interest in natural resources.23 
In a constitutional system of checks and balances, the public trust is 
among the fundamental checks on government. In a nonenvironmental 
case, Stone v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held the following: 
No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals 
. . . The supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is 
continuing in its nature . . . [T]he power of governing is a trust 
committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be 
granted away.24 
The public trust doctrine prohibits complete privatization of sovereign 
resources because privatization would constitute an impermissible 
transfer of governmental power into private hands, wrongfully limiting 
the powers of later legislatures and the rights of the public to safeguard 
crucial societal interests.  
The public trust doctrine also focuses on the government’s 
obligation to protect. Nonalienation is only one aspect of this—as is the 
commercial and recreational boating and temporary anchorage on private riverbeds); Pointe, 
LLC v. Lake Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (public has right 
to use navigable rivers, even where the riverbed may be privately owned because the river 
is not necessary for commerce). In these cases, a parens patriae suit might be warranted. 
21 State v. Hess Corp., 20 A.3d 212, 217, 221 (N.H. 2011). 
22 See Kanner, Public Trust, supra note 1 at 100–01. Some state constitutions explicitly 
embrace the public trust. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1; HAW. 
CONST. art. XI, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
23 See Kanner, Public Trust, supra note 1 at 76–77.  
24 101 U.S. 814, 819–20 (1879). See also Butchers’ Union v. Crescent City, 111 U.S. 
746, 766 (1884) (Field, J., concurring). 
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state’s obligation to protect and, if necessary, restore the public trust.25 
“The State has not only the right but also the affirmative fiduciary 
obligation to ensure that the rights of the public . . . are protected, and 
to seek compensation for any diminution in that trust corpus.”26 This is 
crucial because the trustee cannot have a duty without the ability to 
discharge that duty by litigation for damages or equitable relief. The 
duties owed by a public trustee to protect the public trust are generally 
analogous to those of a private trustee.27 For example, courts have 
adopted § 174 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which states that 
“[t]he fiduciary’s obligations to the dependent party include a duty of 
loyalty and a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care.”28 The 
comments to § 174 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts clarify that if 
the trustees were selected because they have specialized knowledge or 
training, they will be held to that standard of skill and care: “[I]f the 
trustee procured his appointment as trustee by representing that he has 
greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is liable for a 
loss resulting from the failure to use such skill as he has.”29 Trustees, 
therefore, have the authority and duty to protect the public trust from 
tortious interference and to protect the State’s natural resources for the 
benefits of its citizens.30 In New Jersey, a suit in the State’s capacity as 
parens patriae and a suit in its capacity as public trustee of the State’s 
25 Tortious interference with the public trust has suffered from courts and commentators 
confusing a public trust action with a parens patriae one. Kanner, Public Trust, supra note 
1, at 59–62. 
26 N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, 674 (N.J. 
Super. Law Div. 1973), aff’d, 336 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d, 351 
A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976); see also Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm’n v. Mun. Sanitary
Landfill Auth., 348 A.2d 505, 518 (N.J. 1975), vacated 430 U.S. 141 (1977). (“In this area
[of environmental concern] the state has not only a right to protect its own resources, but
also has the duty to do so, in the interests of its citizens, as well as others.”).
27 Times of Trenton Pub. Corp. v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 846 A.2d 659, 667, 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d, Times of Trenton Pub. Corp. v. Lafayette Yard 
Cmty. Dev. Corp., 874 A.2d 1064 (N.J. 2005). 
28 F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 704 (N.J. 1997) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959)). 
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). 
30 See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 
570 (1985) (“Under the common law of trusts, . . . trustees are understood to have all ‘such 
powers as are necessary or appropriate for the carrying out of the purposes of the trust.’” 
(quoting 3 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 186, at 1496 (3d ed. 1967))); See GEORGE G. 
BOGERT, BOGERT ON TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 582 (2011); see also City of Milwaukee v. 
State, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1927). 
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groundwaters generally afford the State identical remedies.31 In effect, 
New Jersey already recognizes a standalone public trust claim, 
including the protection of the public to have meaningful access to the 
state’s beaches.32  
There are a number of reasons favoring the more articulated use and 
development of tortious interference with the public trust. First, parens 
patriae actions for public nuisance involve a balancing of interests, 
which often fails to give due weight to the public’s interest or jus 
publicum, trumping private interests or the jus privatum. Second, these 
same public nuisance claims do not compensate the public trust for loss 
of use of the damaged property and the delta between abatement and 
restoration to pre-nuisance conditions. In multi-defendant cases, a 
series of abatement orders may produce a patchwork of fixes as 
opposed to an appropriate trustee-implemented master plan.33 Third, a 
minority of courts have not favored public nuisance claims against a 
product manufacturer.34 Fourth, a minority of courts have failed to 
allow the state to sue for trespass despite the jus publicum because a 
parens patriae plaintiff does not have a sufficient property interest to 
sustain a trespass action for natural resources which belong to 
everyone. The argument generally is that the trustee lacks a right to 
exclusive possession of the resource which belongs to everyone.35 
31 N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (rejecting “artificial differences between the State’s role as 
public trustee and its role under the fiction of parens patriae”), rev’d on other grounds, 351 
A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976). This does not appear to be the view of the majority of states.
32 See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 119
(N.J. 2005). 
33 New Jersey has recognized that an award of money damages is appropriate in natural 
resource damages public nuisance cases, N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot. v. Hess, No. A-2893-18T2, 
2020 WL 1683180, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 7, 2020). Vermont has adopted 
this approach. State of Vt. v. 3M Co., No. 547-6-19, slip op. at 14–15 (Vt. Super. Ct. May 
8, 2020) (order granting 3M’s motion to dismiss) (regarding PFAS contamination). 
34 3M Co., No. 547-6-19 at 6–7. 
35 See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Env’t. Prot. v. Deull Fuel Co., No. ATL-L-1839-18 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. Aug. 8, 2019) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss trespass claim on the 
basis that the broad application of the public trust doctrine trumps the exclusivity element 
of a trespass claim), c.f. N.J. Dep’t. of Env’t. Prot. v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. UNN-L-3026-
04, 2008 WL 4177038 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., Aug. 29, 2008) (rejecting a trespass claim 
because of lack of exclusive possession). From an economic point of view, this encourages 
pollution of public resources where such tortious invasions are not actionable as trespass 
and not actionable for loss of use under a public trust theory. In a standalone public trust 
claim, the jus publicum of the people would count as a protected interest allowing the trustee 
to act to deter and remedy tortious invasions of the public trust. The standalone public trust 
tort could bring a trespass-like action including an undoing of the invasion and resulting 
damages. This is a superior approach to protecting the public trust. 
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However, it is well settled that in other contexts a trustee may sue for 
trespass to property owned by trust beneficiaries.36 Trespass which 
tolerates no invasion of interests may be a better fit for public trustees 
than public nuisance. Fifth, parens patriae causes of action lack the 
evolutionary purpose of public trust cases as set forth in cases like 
Illinois Central. Sixth, remedies that are suited to private individuals 
may not work for natural resources protected by the public trust. For 
example, public nuisance is often limited to abating the nuisance, 
though some courts have moved away from this, recognizing that 
the trustee can only undo damages to scarce natural resources with 
money to pay for natural resource damages. We are seeing more parens 
patriae cases attempting to invoke the public trust doctrine to 
address these and related concerns.37 However, both parens patriae and 
tortious interference with public trust can and should also evolve 
independently. 
The public trust means the jus publicum trumps the jus privatum. 
This was the case in Illinois Central. Likewise, in Just v. Marinette 
County, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld wetland regulations that 
diminished property values under the public trust doctrine without 
finding a takings, meaning the jus privatum takes subject to the jus 
publicum: 
This case causes us to re-examine the concepts of public benefit 
in contrast to public harm and the scope of the owner’s right to use 
of his property. In the instant case we have a restriction on the use of 
a citizens’ property, not to secure a benefit for the public, but to 
prevent a harm from the change in the natural character of the 
citizens’ property. We start with the premise that lakes and rivers in 
their natural state are unpolluted and the pollution which now exists 
is man-made. The state of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a 
duty to eradicate the present pollution and to prevent further pollution 
in its navigable waters. This is not, in a legal sense, a gain or a 
securing of a benefit by the maintaining of the natural status quo 
of the environment. What makes this case different from most 
condemnation or police power zoning cases is the interrelationship 
of the wetlands, the swamps and the natural environment of 
shorelands to the purity of the water and to such natural resources as 
navigation, fishing, and scenic beauty. Swamps and wetlands were 
once considered wasteland, undesirable, and not picturesque. But as 
the people became more sophisticated, an appreciation was acquired 
that swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the 
36 See generally Deull Fuel Co., No. ATL-L-1839-18.  
37 See, e.g., State v. Hess Corp., 20 A.3d 212, 217 (N.H. 2011). 
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balance of nature and are essential to the purity of the water in our 
lakes and streams.38 
Cases like Just v. Marinette County, and others,39 remind us that the 
public trust requires us to look at the positives to the trust and its 
beneficiaries, not just the negatives, as is often the case in some parens 
patriae litigation.40 Thus, for example, a public trust approach allows 
for loss of use damages and restoration for damaged resources both to 
compensate the public and to incentivize the tortfeasor to restore 
resources as quickly as possible.41 
Parens patriae often focuses on loss and requires “an injury to a 
‘quasi sovereign’ interest” (an interest different from the interest of 
private parties), and that the injury is to a “substantial segment of the 
population.”42 Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, was decided as a 
parens patriae case.43 The underlying issue arose in the labor context 
but does a good job of explaining the concept: 
Parens patriae means literally “parent of the country.” The parens 
patriae action has its roots in the common-law concept of the 
“royal prerogative.” The royal prerogative included the right or 
responsibility to take care of persons who “are legally unable, on 
account of mental incapacity, whether it proceed from 1st. nonage: 
2. idiocy: or 3. lunacy: to take proper care of themselves and their
property.” At a fairly early date, American courts recognized
this common-law concept, but now in the form of a legislative
prerogative: “This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal
person or in the legislature [and] is a most beneficent function . . .
often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for
the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.”44
38 Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W. 2d 761, 767–68 (1972). However, the court veered 
into an abbreviated discussion of its quasi-sovereign interests before returning to a public 
trust analysis. Id. 
39 See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot., 64 F. Supp 2d 354 (D.N.J. 
1999).  
40 See, e.g., In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980); Nat’l Ass’n 
of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999). 
41 N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. ExxonMobil, 923 A.2d 345, 353–54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2007).  
42 Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982); State v. Hess Corp., 
20 A.3d 212, 217 (N.H. 2011); State v. City of Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 529 (N.H. 2006); 
Rhode Island v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 357 F. Supp. 3d 129, 136 (D. R.I. 2018); Quapaw 
Tribe of Okla. v. Blue Tee Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1178 (N.D. Okla. 2009). 
43 Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607. 
44 Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 
(1890)). 
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Tortious interference with the public trust action is a stand-alone 
claim tied to government’s fiduciary duties regarding public 
resources.45 Parens patriae is a tool of the state’s police power. The 
parens patriae claim gives the state standing to protect its quasi-
sovereign interests by prosecuting the nongovernmental rights of its 
citizens under various state causes of action, such as public nuisance,46 
strict liability,47 trespass,48 and unjust enrichment,49 among others.50 In 
some cases, the state may sue under the public trust and as parens 
patriae51 for damages and unjust enrichment.52  
In re Matter of Steuart Transportation likewise relied on both public 
trust and parens patriae language to find state and federal rights to sue 
for the loss of migrating waterfowl resulting from an oil spill while 
explaining their differences: 
45 Hess Corp., 20 A.3d at 216–17; State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 
(Ohio 1974); Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Md. 
1972); N.J. Dept. of Env’t. Prot. v. Deull Fuel, No. ATL-L-1839-18 (N.J. Super. L. Aug. 8, 
2019) (basing trespass on public trust). 
46 See, e.g., N.J. Dept. Env’t. Prot. v. Hess Corp., 2020 WL 1683180, at *6 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. April 7, 2020) (recognizing public nuisance and right to monetary damages 
for abatement).  
47 See, e.g., id. (recognizing strict liability). 
48 State v. City of Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 527, 530 (N.H. 2006) (state has parens patriae 
authority to bring claims including trespass). 
49 Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. U.S., 389 U.S. 191, 200–01 (1967). 
50 For example, New Jersey caselaw on parens patriae has emphasized that a state alone 
is “the proper party to sue for recovery of damages to the environment,” and has even 
rejected an earlier decision negating a state’s authority to sue in trespass, because the earlier 
decision had improperly denied a state’s “property right” in natural resources. Dept. of Env’t 
Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 336 A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) 
(rejecting Com. v. Agway, Inc., 232 A.2d 69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)), rev’d on other grounds, 
351 A.2d 337 (1976); accord Lansco, Inc. v. Dept. Env’t Prot., 350 A.2d 520, 524 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (parens patriae doctrine recognizes that a “sovereign’s interest in 
the preservation of public resources . . . enables it to maintain an action to prevent injury 
thereto”), aff’d, 368 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
51 In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
52 Entry Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, State v. Monsanto Co., No. A 
1801237, slip op. (Sept. 19, 2018) (Lisa Allen, J.):  
As previously stated, Ohio’s suit follows the actions brought by the States of Oregon 
and Washington to bring these claims in its parens patriae capacity to redress the 
injuries to the health and well-being of its citizens through exposure to its 
environment made toxic by PCBs. Monsanto accurately states that parens patriae, 
while recognized as the instrument that allows and instructs the State of Ohio to 
bringing claims against other entities to protect the rights and health of its citizens, 
only serves as a mechanism of standing. The public trust doctrine, however, may yet 
prove to stand as its own cause of action as society’s needs change. See e.g., State v. 
City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1974); State v. Monsanto Co., No. 
3:18-cv-00238 (D. Or. 2017). 
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This Court is of the opinion that both of these doctrines are viable 
and support the State and the Federal claims for the waterfowl . . . . 
Under the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United 
States have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public’s 
interest in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from 
ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the people. 
Likewise, under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state acts to protect 
a quasi-sovereign interest where no individual cause of action would 
lie. In the case currently before this Court, no individual citizen could 
seek recovery for the waterfowl, and the state certainly has a 
sovereign interest in preserving wildlife resources.53 
In some cases, the trustee may “bring suit [as parens patriae] to 
protect a broader range of natural resources than the public trust 
doctrine because it does not require state ownership of such 
resources.”54 Many opinions recognize tort remedies including strict 
liability, nuisance, and trespass, as tools for the state or its trustee to 
fulfill its fiduciary duty to the public. However, these same opinions 
are unclear as to whether the action is based on the public trust or on a 
parens patriae theory.  
Because of some overlap (in the sense of both being applicable to 
a given case) and some jurisprudential confusion, some courts 
erroneously label public trust claims as “parens patriae” cases, and 
vice versa. These courts, and other courts, seemingly improperly 
examine public trust cases in terms of the elements of other tort claims, 
such as public nuisance. Sometimes the court gets it right when the 
advocate may not.55 On the other hand, as shown below, the tort of 
tortious interference involves an unreasonable interference with the 
public trust.56 Clearly, a wrongful interference exists if defendant 
engaged in trespass-like conduct57 or a public nuisance-like situation, 
for example, so we are not faulting that analysis; instead, we address 
the labeling of the underlying state claim that the court is vindicating.58 
In some cases, the label may not matter to the outcome, but it often 
53 Id. at 40 (citations omitted). 
54 State v. Hess Corp., 20 A.3d 212, 216 (N.H. 2011) (citing New Mexico v. Gen. Elec., 
467 F.3d 1223, 1243 n.30 (10th Cir. 2006)).  
55 Hess Corp., 20 A.3d at 217 (“Here, however, the State does not explicitly rely upon 
the public trust doctrine as a separate cause of action”). 
56 Id.; In re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
57 State of Rhode Island v. Atlantic Richfield, 357 F. Supp. 3d 129 (D.R.I. 2018); N.J. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Deull Fuel Co., No. ATL-L-1839-18 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Aug. 8, 
2019). 
58 Hess Corp., 20 A.3d at 217 (where court acknowledges the expansion of parens 
patriae standing in the context of whether damages relating to privately owned wells was 
available to the State).  
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does matter. Specifically, the elements of tortious interference do not 
require proof of a public nuisance, trespass, or any other tort. 
III 
ELEMENTS OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
A. Elements
In order to show tortious interference with the public trust,59 the 
State needs to show 
(1) a protectable public trust interest;60
(2) an unreasonable interference with that interest;61 and
(3) a reasonable likelihood that the interference caused the loss to that
protected interest or nexus.62
59 Id. 
60 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459–460 (1892) (stating each state’s 
public trust doctrine may vary within certain boundaries). 
61 Hess Corp., 20 A.3d at 216 (“To bring a successful [public trust] claim, the State must 
prove an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of trust rights.”) (citing 
Kanner, Public Trust, supra note 1, at 59). An interference can be unreasonable in many 
ways, including: (1) the interest pursued is illegitimate, or (2) the means used are 
inappropriate. Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 336, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007). By way of analogy, and recognizing that public rights may vary between a public 
trust claim and a parens patriae action for public nuisance, Section 821B(1) of the 
Restatement refers us to three circumstances listed in § 821B(2), any of which may sustain 
a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable: (1) “[w]hether the conduct 
involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, 
the public comfort or the public convenience;” (2) “whether the conduct is proscribed by a 
statute;” or (3) “whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent 
or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect 
upon the public right.” Id. § 821B(2)(a)–(c). The Restatement comments that these three 
circumstances for determining unreasonable interference: 
are not conclusive tests controlling the determination of whether an interference with 
a public right is unreasonable. They are listed in the disjunctive; any one may warrant 
a holding of unreasonableness. They also do not purport to be exclusive. Some 
courts have shown a tendency, for example, to treat significant interferences with 
recognized aesthetic values or established principles of conservation of natural 
resources as amounting to a public nuisance. The language of Subsection (2) is not 
intended to set restrictions against developments of this nature. 
Id. § 821B, cmt. E. 
62 N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot. v. Dimant, 51 A.3d 816, 829–31 (N.J. 2012) (nexus required). 
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B. Protectable Public Trust Interest
In a natural resource damage case, a protectable public trust interest 
includes water bottoms,63 waterfront land,64 migratory birds,65 fisheries 
habitat,66 groundwater,67 air, land and water,68 coastal waters,69 
wildlife, and other natural resources by which the injured resource is 
no longer able to serve the everchanging public interest. Protected 
public trust interests continue to develop at common law and include 
both the defense, restoration, or enhancement of natural resources 
damages70 and access to those resources.71 
This has become particularly clear in recent cases involving the 
injury to natural resources caused by products like MTBE,72 PCBs,73 
PFAS74, and legacy pollution cases.75 The courts focus on the substance 
of the interest, not necessarily its form.76 The public interest preexisted 
63 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (water bottoms as part of public 
trust). 
64 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 389 (1892); State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 
A.2d 1128, 1134 (Vt. 1989).
65 In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp 38, 39 (D. Va. 1980) (such rights derive from
duty owing to the people, not ownership of the resources). 
66 State v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 820 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (fiduciary obligation of 
trustee to seek damages for injury to trust). 
67 State v. Hess, 20 A.3d 212, 216 (N.H. 2011) (public trust claim for groundwater). 
68 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907). 
69 State Dep’t Nat. Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp 1060, 1067 (D. Md. 1972). 
70 State v. 3M, Co., Dkt. No. 547-6-19 Cncv (Vt. Super. Ct., May 27, 2020) (recognizing 
natural resource damage cause of action). 
71 E.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54–55 
(N.J. 1972); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (ecological benefits of 
tidelands). 
72 Rhode Island v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 357 F. Supp. 3d 129, 143–44 (D.R.I. 2018) 
(protecting natural resources, but as a federal court sitting in diversity, rejecting application 
of public trust to groundwater). 
73 State v. Monsanto, No. 18-cv-00540, at 17. 
74 State v. 3M Co., Dkt. No. 547-6-19 Cncv (Vt. Super. Ct., May 28, 2020); State v. 3M 
Co., Dkt. 216-2019-cv-00445 (N.H. Super. Ct. June 25, 2020) (Order, Nicolosi, J). 
75 N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Deull Fuel Co., No. ATL-L-1839 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. Aug. 8, 2019). 
76 The trial court concluded that “absent an agreement that would obligate Sharp to 
continue doing business with Printing Mart v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 36 (N.J. 
1989). . . , there was no basis for an intentional-interference claim.” Id. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that although a complaint based on tortious interference must allege facts 
that show a protectable right such as a prospective economic or contractual relationship, 
“the right need not equate with that found in an enforceable contract[.]” Id. at 751. Conduct 
is considered wrongful if the defendant interfered with the public trust for the sake of 
appropriating its benefits. Conduct is also wrongful if the defendant acted for the purpose 
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and survived the creation of private property rights; the public trust may 
overlap and trump private property rights. The limits imposed on 
private property by the public trust have been the subject of numerous 
cases, finding in favor of the State’s right to enforce the jus publicum 
without committing a taking.77 For example, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts held that when the federal government or 
the State conveys public trust property to a private individual, that 
individual takes subject to the terms of the trust—“[t]he trust is of such 
a nature that it can be held only by the sovereign, and can only be 
destroyed by the destruction of the sovereign.”78 Our analysis here 
focuses on natural resource damage public trust cases, but it is worth 
noting that the public trust extends to more than just natural resources.79 
Part of the public trust doctrine and its protectable interests reveal 
how society harmonizes private property rights (jus privatum) and 
public property rights (jus publicum).80 Strictly speaking, the public 
trust arises from the State’s duty to its citizens, not traditional property 
law.81 The case law clearly provides the states with the common law 
of producing the interference, or with knowledge that interference was substantially certain 
to occur. 
77 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of the U.S. v. State Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 64 F. Supp. 
2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999), that held that (1) formerly submerged and then artificially filled in 
land is held subject to public right of access to use and enjoy the property, even after it was 
alienated to private owners, because of jus publicum, 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 357–58 (D.N.J. 
1999) (citing Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984)); (2) 
conservation easement to use and enjoy property under public trust, id. at 361 n.1; (3) right 
of access thru private property, id. at 358–59. See also Karam v. State Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 
705 A.2d 1221, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 723 A.2d 943 (N.J. 1999). 
78 United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981); contra 
Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C. 1980) (“To the extent that plaintiff’s 
argument advances the proposition that defendants are charged with ‘trust’ duties 
distinguishable from their statutory duties, the Court disagrees. Rather, the Court views the 
statutory duties previously discussed as comprising all the responsibilities which defendants 
[National Park Service] must faithfully discharge.”). 
79 See, e.g., Myers v. Alutiiq Int’l Sols., LLC, 811 F. Supp. 2d 261, 267 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(the United States Court of Claims has recognized that “[t]ransactions relating to the 
expenditure of public funds require the highest degree of public trust . . . .”).  
80 The res communes are things like air, water, and light that cannot be owned. The res 
nullius belong to no one because they were unappropriated, such as unoccupied lands or 
wild animals.  
81 In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D. Va. 1980) (holding that state may 
recover for damage to migratory birds. Such right does not derive from ownership of the 
resources but from a duty owing to the people); State v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 820 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1980) (allowing state to recover for loss of fisheries habitat even absent a statutory 
provision allowing recovery, saying “the state, through the Department, has the fiduciary 
obligation of any trustee to seek damages for injury to the object of its trust”); Toomer v. 
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power to protect the public trust. Each state is a trustee of its natural 
resources.82 In Phillip Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, the court explained, 
“[I]t has been long established that the individual States have the 
authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to 
recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”83 What is less 
often discussed is how to cubbyhole or name the common law theories 
of liability available to the states. The scope of private property rights 
is decided by the state, subject to the public trust, and private property 
is taken subject to that understanding. In ExxonMobil, Judge Anzaldi 
specifically found that public trust extended to Exxon’s private 
property but rejected trespass theory on the “exclusive possession” 
issue.84 In Deull Fuel Judge Mendez reached the opposite conclusion 
on trespass that “the public trust doctrine trumps the exclusivity 
element of a trespass claim”: 
This responsibility to protect public lands and natural resources 
forms the basis of the State to take action consistent with the policy 
stated by the Legislature. In this court’s opinion, the remedy of 
trespassing as outlined in Count Four of the Complaint is available to 
the State as it performs its fiduciary obligation to ensure the rights of 
the public and to prosecute claims to protect the environment. Based 
on the facts alleged in the Complaint, the Public Trust Doctrine 
trumps the exclusivity element of a trespass claim. While possessory 
interests are usually for individual owners themselves to protect, 
when the harm is as extensive to the State’s natural resources as 
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (upholding state’s right “to conserve or utilize its 
resources on behalf of its own citizens”).  
Likewise, under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state acts to protect a quasi-sovereign 
interest where an individual cause of action would lie. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 
of Cal., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Haw. 1969), rev’d on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 
1970), aff’d, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).  
82 As per Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 419 (1842), the natural resources of 
the State of New Jersey, and all States, belong to the State. States further gained ownership 
of the water bottoms of navigable waters upon statehood and held them in trust for the people 
of the state (i.e., the public trust), which was upheld by, and memorialized in, case law in 
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. Montana, 565 U.S. 
576, 603 (2012) reiterated that “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.” As 
such, it is a state’s responsibility as a trustee to protect the public trust. While there is 
considerable discussion around the concept of a federal trustee in the form of federal 
environmental agencies, there should be no question that the state’s duty to protect its natural 
resources is far more definitive and concrete than that of a purported federal trustee. There 
are very real questions as to the validity and basis of a federal claim for restoration of state 
natural resources, despite creative attempts by the federal government to extend their 
jurisdiction via the commerce clause.  
83 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988). 
84 N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 2008 WL 4177038 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. Aug. 29, 2008). 
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outlined in the Complaint, the harm is not just to the individual, but 
to the people of New Jersey as a whole.85 
The jus publicum exists even if “the State [does] not expressly retain 
its rights as public trustee in the conveying instruments.”86 It follows 
that 
[t]itle is not synonymous with trusteeship. In National Ass’n of Home
Builders v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envt. Prot., the court held that:
title to such ‘public trust property’ is subject to the public’s right 
to use and enjoy the property, even if such property is alienated 
to private owners. . . This right of the public to use and enjoy 
such ‘public trust lands’ does not disappear simply because the 
land that was once submerged is filled in.87 
The reality is that since the State originally holds the property in trust 
for the people, “[it] cannot convey to their prejudice.”88 
The U.S. Supreme Court first fully delineated the parameters of the 
environmental public trust doctrine in 1892 in Illinois Central Railroad 
v. Illinois.89 In that case, the Court was asked to settle the ownership of
submerged lands extending out from Chicago under Lake Michigan.90
In 1869, the Illinois legislature passed an act which gave the Illinois
Central Railroad Company the right to use and develop the land.91
However, in 1873 the state repealed the act.92 When the railroad
company continued to develop the land, the Illinois Attorney General
filed suit against it.93
85 N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot. v. Deull Fuel, No. ATL-L-1839-18, 7, 9 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 
Aug. 8, 2019).  
86 ExxonMobil, 2008 WL 4177038. 
87 Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 
358 (D.N.J. 1999)).  
88 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 57 (1821).  
89 See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The “public trust” 
language was used in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 11 U.S. 367, 369 (1842). Martin spawned 
a line of similar cases that was incorporated into and expanded upon in the Illinois Central 
decision, which restricted the government from making corrupt gifts to private interests. See 
generally Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845); see also McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 
(1876); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855). 
90 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 433. 
91 See id. at 448–49. 
92 See id. at 449. 
93 See id. at 433. For an in-depth look at the background of this complex case, see Joseph 
D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine:
What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71. U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004).
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The Court found for the State of Illinois, holding that the rights 
granted by the statute were revocable.94 The Court acknowledged that 
the State of Illinois held the title to the lands under the water of Lake 
Michigan, and that, in general, title carries with it freedom of 
alienation.95 But the title the state holds in public lands is “different in 
character . . . [because] [i]t is a title held in trust for the people of the 
state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have the liberty of fishing therein . . . .”96 
The state may grant parcels of the property in this public trust for the 
construction of “wharves, piers, and docks” to the extent that the 
structures improve the people’s interest in the land.97 But, the Court 
observed, this is “a very different doctrine from the one which would 
sanction the abdication of the general control of the state over lands.”98 
It held that “the state can no more abdicate its trust over property in 
which the whole people are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police 
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the 
peace.”99 In other words, the state may grant control of the trust to a 
private organization in order to improve the land because private 
organizations may be in a better position than the state to effectuate 
that improvement.100 But any such improvements must be for the 
benefit of the people, who are the beneficiaries of the land.101 Such 
grants to private organizations are “necessarily revocable,” and “the 
power to resume the trust whenever the state judges best is . . . 
incontrovertible.”102 The Supreme Court in Illinois Central applied the 
constitutional reserved powers doctrine to natural resources, which are 
held in trust and cannot be fully privatized.103 At issue was control of 
Chicago’s harbor, which the Illinois legislature had privatized. In an 
explanation that extends beyond submerged lands, the Court explained 
the rationale of the public trust doctrine:  
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the 
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under 
them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private 
94 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452–53. 
95 See id. at 452. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 452. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 453. 
100 See id. at 455. 
101 See id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 453–55. 
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parties . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration 
of government and the preservation of the peace. . . . Any grant of the 
kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which 
the property was held by the state can be resumed at any time. . . . 
The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental, and 
cannot be alienated . . . .104 
Illinois Central made clear that alienating or destroying essential 
resources would amount to relinquishing sovereign powers in violation 
of the constitution’s reserved powers doctrine.105 Land must remain 
with the sovereign in perpetuity.106 Legislatures cannot be assumed to 
intend to “casually dispose of irreplaceable public assets” through an 
act designed to merely simplify land title transactions. “[W]e cannot 
ascribe to the legislature an intention that [sovereign lands] be 
permitted to be lost by default.”107 Sovereign lands are not subject to 
alienability to the same degree as other lands held by the state.108  
The public trust creates the freedom to enjoy clean air and water, to 
recreate, and to otherwise enjoy and benefit from nature without regard 
to the self-interest of private parties who may have disproportionate 
influence over government. The public trust makes us all equal, and no 
amount of wealth or political influence can make one more equal or 
entitled than the whole of us.109 As Professor Wood has written, the 
public trust ensures that the government serves the common good, not 
itself or private individuals pursuing their own interests.110 Quoting 
Geer v. Connecticut, 
104 Id. (emphasis added). 
105 See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 72, 234 (2013); WOOD, 
supra note 14, at 131; see also Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas 
Trading Schemes: A Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 287, 311 (2010). 
106 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452–53; see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior 
Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (“[The public trust] is an affirmation of the duty of the 
state to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, 
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right 
is consistent with the purposes of the trust.”). 
107 State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Iowa 1989); see also Coastal Petroleum Co. 
v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 344 (Fla. 1986).
108 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452 (holding that title to public trust lands is “different
in character from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale”). Accordingly, a 
state’s marketable title act may not divest the people of their sovereign lands “by default.” 
Legislatures can’t be assumed to intend to “casually dispose of irreplaceable public assets” 
through an act designed to merely simplify land title transactions. Coastal Petroleum Co., 
492 So. 2d at 344; see Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d at 362 (“[W]e cannot ascribe to the legislature 
an intention that [sovereign lands] be permitted to be lost by default.”). 
109 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387. 
110 WOOD, supra note 14, at 127. 
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the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common 
ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as 
a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the 
advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for the 
benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public 
good.111 
The public interest evolves. “The industrial revolution has given 
way to the environmental revolution.”112 The state administers the 
public trust and retains the continuing power that “extends to the 
revocation of previously granted rights or to the enforcement of the 
trust against lands long thought free of the trust.”113 
For example, New Jersey has recognized the broad nature of the 
public trust doctrine, and as such, application of the public trust 
doctrine has expanded over time.114 “[I]t has been long established that 
the individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands 
held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they 
see fit.”115 For example, the Court in Arnold v. Mundy held that the 
public trust included land between the high and low tidewater level, 
dispelling the notion that the Doctrine might apply just to tidal 
waters.116 This evolved to include neighboring land and reasonable 
access, even if that access involved crossing private property.117 Still 
more, the public trust doctrine has been applied not only to the 
resources themselves, such as marshes and upland forests, but also to 
the public’s right to recreational uses, for example, in the tidal lands, 
including bathing, swimming, and other shore activities.118  
New Jersey law describes the important role of natural resources to 
this State:  
111 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896). 
112 Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1101 (D. Idaho 2003). 
113 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1983); 
State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128, 1136 (Vt. 1989). 
114 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 493 (1988). 
115 Id.  at 475. “[T]he public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law . . . .” PPL Mont., 
LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012). “[E]ach state has dealt with the lands . . . within 
its borders according to its own views of justice and policy . . . .” Shively v. Bowlby, 152 
U.S. 1, 26 (1894). 
116 See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 8 (1821). 
117 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112, 121–22 (N.J. 2005). 
118  Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 
1972). This broad interpretation of the public trust doctrine has also been adopted by other 
states, including California, though perhaps not as broadly as New Jersey has. See, e.g., 
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
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New Jersey’s lands and waters constitute a unique and delicately 
balanced resource; [] the protection and preservation of these lands 
and waters promotes the health, safety and welfare of the people of 
this State; [] the tourist and recreation industry dependent on clean 
waters and beaches is vital to the economy of this State; [and] the 
discharge of petroleum products and other hazardous substances 
within or outside the jurisdiction of this State constitutes a threat to 
the economy and environment of this State . . . .119  
The Spill Act’s broad definition of natural resources arguably 
constitutes an effort to strengthen the public trust doctrine, especially 
as it relates to remedies. 
C. Unreasonable Interference
Unreasonable interference, especially in the natural resource 
context, can occur in a number of ways, and traditional tort concepts 
may illuminate whether an interference is unreasonable.120 Illinois 
Central is clearly a public trust case, which restrains the trustee from 
alienating the public trust, arguably the most extreme form of 
interference: 
The harbor of Chicago is of immense value to the people of the State 
of Illinois, . . . and the idea that its legislature can deprive the State 
of control over its bed and waters, and place the same in the hands of 
a private corporation, created for a different purpose,—one limited to 
transportation of passengers and freight between distant points and 
the city,—is a proposition that cannot be defended.121 
Interference may also include destroying natural resources, which is 
another extreme form of interference. In State of Ohio v. City of 
Bowling Green, the Ohio Supreme Court allowed money damages to 
the State for a fish kill that resulted from a mishap at the municipality’s 
sewage treatment plant.122 The court noted that “the state holds. . . such 
119 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(a) (West 2020). 
120 See Am. Metal Co. v. Fluid Chem. Co., 296 A.2d 348, 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1972) (noting that some courts recognize trespass as an action to recover damages for 
interference with an easement, that the more common approach is to regard interference 
with an easement as trespass on the case but that the distinction is academic and the action 
sounds in tort). See also Dep’t of Transp. v. PSC Res., Inc., 419 A.2d 1151, 1157 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div.1980) (“Torts against the environment find their origin in the law of 
nuisance and trespass.”) The common law cause of action is nuisance, under which “the 
State has the right to obtain damages for an injury to public resources or the environment.” 
Ohaus v. Cont’l Cas. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 179, 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (citing 
Lansco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), aff’d, 
368 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)). 
121 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892). 
122 State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ohio 1974). 
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wildlife as a trustee for all citizens.”123 “An action against those whose 
conduct damages or destroys such property, which is a natural resource 
of the public, must be considered an essential part of a trust doctrine, 
the vitality of which must be extended to meet the changing societal 
needs.”124 
In State of Maryland, Dept. of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess, 
the court allowed an action for money damages for an oil spill in State 
waters that damaged the waters, fish, and birds.125 The Court found the 
Crown’s Charter to Lord Baltimore to be broad enough to cover these 
resources and to find an unreasonable and actionable interference.126 
In Attorney General, State of Michigan v. Hermes the Court also 
allowed the state as trustee to bring a civil action for money damages 
to protect its fisheries.127 It followed other cases, including Bowling 
Green and Amerada Hess.  
Public nuisance claims protect against a broader array of 
interferences.128 The Restatement definition nevertheless provides an 
initial standard for assessing whether the parties have stated a claim 
for common law interference. The Restatement definition of public 
nuisance set out in § 821B(a) has two elements: an unreasonable 
interference and a right common to the general public.129 Section 
821B(2) further explains: 
Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a 
public right is unreasonable include the following: 
(a) whether the conduct involves a significant interference with
the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the
public comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has
produced a permanent and long-lasting effect, and, as the
actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect
upon the public right.130
123 Id. at 411.  
124 Id. at 283. 
125 Maryland v. Hess, 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972). 
126 Id. at 1066.  
127 Att’y Gen. v. Hermes, 339 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
128 See generally Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Harris, 518 A.2d 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1986). 
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
130 Id. § 821B(2). 
60 J. ENV’T LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 36, 39 
This is helpful but not sufficient if the public trust is at issue. 
For example, interference is unreasonable when it (a) significantly 
interferes with the (changing) public interest, and (b) a significant 
interference exists when a conflict arises between the jus publicum and 
jus privatum, say, when a developer wants to build on wetlands, though 
both acts and omissions by the private landowner may give risk to that 
conflict. 
A defendant’s interference is unreasonable relative to the jus 
publicum. A public nuisance then is “an unreasonable interference with 
a right common to the general public” or the interest of the public at 
large.131 Under common law, the destruction and alteration of natural 
resources is generally without justification. Unjustified interference 
may also arise from engaging in abnormally dangerous activities, 
including the discharge of hazardous substances.132 Those who 
“introduce extraordinary risk of harm into the community for their own 
benefit” are strictly liable.133 Even manufacturers may be held liable by 
the state for trespass.134 Conduct may also be considered wrongful 
if the defendant interfered with the public trust for the sake of 
appropriating its benefits. Additionally, conduct may be wrongful if the 
defendant acted for the purpose of producing the interference, or with 
knowledge that interference was substantially certain to occur.135 
Conduct may also be wrongful if it is an independently wrongful act, 
culpable apart from its effect on the public trust. 
131 James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g. (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
132 Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Ventron, 468 A.2d 150, 158 (N.J. 1983); Dep’t of Env’t Prot. 
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 22 A.3d 1, 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
133 Biniek v. ExxonMobil Corp., 898 A.2d 330, 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002)
(citing T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991)). 
134 In re MTBE, 725 F.3d 65, 120 (2nd Cir. 2013) (upholding jury verdict on trespass in 
New York case). 
135 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 1 (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
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Nuisance,136 trespass,137 strict liability,138 conversion,139 products 
liability140 and negligence teach us a great deal about interference. 
However, these legal cubbyholes often obscure the boundaries between 
jus publicum and jus privatum.141 Thinking and talking in terms of 
tortious interferences with the public trust provides a more illuminating 
way of analyzing this boundary under a specific set of circumstances.142 
In the end, courts will decide if there is a duty on the basis of the 
evolving standards of the community. Practical rules and not 
formalistic quibbling should determine duties. As Justice Holmes said, 
“it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was 
laid down in the time of Henry IV.”143 In general it should not matter if 
the label “tortious interference with public trust” hardly appears in the 
case law.144  
136 Nuisance remedies include abatement, loss of use, and, if nuisance is permanent, 
money damages for permanent nuisance. Md., Dep’t. of Nat. Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 
350 F. Supp. 1060, 1068 (D. Md. 1972) held that the State may “seek damages for the cost 
of abating such nuisance” but not under the facts of that case; see also San Jose v. Monsanto, 
231 F. Supp. 3d 357 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (PCBs); In re MTBE Products Liability Litigation, 
725 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) (theories of trespass, public nuisance, negligence and failure 
to warn).  
137 Id.; Rhode Island v. Atlantic Richfield, 357 F. Supp. 3d 129 (D.R.I. 2018); State v. 
Monsanto, No. 18-cv-00540 (“It is true that the State of Oregon must allow some use of 
public trust lands and waterways” but statutes foreboding certain specific invasions show 
that “the State enjoys the right . . . to bring actions to recover for trespasses” by PCBs); Att’y 
Gen. v. Hermes, 339 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. 
Deull Fuel Co., No. ATL-L-1839-18 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Aug. 8, 2019).  
138 Id.; In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d at 91. 
139 See Hermes, 339 N.W.2d at 550 (state may sue to protect state waters and wildlife, 
including suit for conversion of fish). 
140 Id. 
141 Separate and apart from the jus publicum, the state’s police power “routinely 
exercises a great deal of regulatory authority over privately owned land.” Joseph Sax, The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. 
L. REV. 471, 489–502 (1970).
142 Cf. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 927–69 (4th ed. 1971) (tortious
interference to protect society is interest in commercial stability and contractual integrity in 
business relations or prospective economic advantage); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS 
§§ 762–774B (AM. L. INST. 1979).
143 Oliver Wendell Homes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 485, 469 (1897).
144 J. Smith, Tort Without Particular Names, 69 U. PENN. L. REV. 91 (January 1921).
The title of Book III, Bishop on Non-Contract Law, is—“Wrongs with Particular
Names.” The first twelve chapters of Book III [] are “each devoted to a wrong to
which the law has given a name [].” Then follows Chapter XXV, on “Wrongs not
Named”; wherein the author says “If a wrongful act whereby one injures another has
received no name, the consequence does not follow that it will be without redress.”
And he further says: “. . . the fact that we can find in our books no name for a wrong
is not to any degree evidence that it is not actionable.”
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D. Nexus
There must also be a nexus between that wrongful interference and 
the loss to the protected interest. This requires proof that defendant’s 
act or omission directly or indirectly led or contributed to the harm, 
regardless of other causes. That is, the wrongful act damaged the public 
trust. Damages or remedies within the nexus of harm must be 
determined. Harm often refers to the disruption of the ecosystem:  
Biological integrity . . . refers to the capacity to support and maintain 
a balanced, integrated adaptive biological system having the full 
range of elements (genes, species, and assemblages) and processes 
(mutation, demography, biotic interactions, nutrient and energy 
dynamics, and metapopulation processes) expected in the natural 
habitat of a region.145 
A nexus exists even if there is only a de minimis impact. 
“Application of [the de minimis] doctrine…may involve making it 
equally so elsewhere. In total consequence, the State’s trust interests 
. . . could be affected . . . considerably more than a trifling matter.”146 
Cumulative impacts matter.147  
Nexus is different from proximate cause.148 The trustee must be able 
to identify an articulable nexus between the business transacted by the 
defendant and the resulting claim being sued upon.149 The nexus can be 
based on geography, market share, waste streams or other case-by-case 
and site-specific factors. In public nuisance cases, the plaintiff is 
generally required to prove causation—that “the defendant created or 
assisted in the creation of the nuisance,”150 which is more than a nexus 
requirement. However, if that role cannot be traced, courts may rely on 
See also William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 
MICH. L. REV. 874 (1938–39).  
145 JAMES R. KARR & ELLEN W. CHU, PERSPECTIVES ON ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY 34–
48 (Laura Westra & John Lemons eds., 1995). Note ecological integrity is broader, including 
biological, chemical and physical integrity. JAMES R. KARR, ENGINEERING WITHIN 
ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS 97–109 (Peter C. Schulze, ed., 1996).  
146 People v. Broedell, 112 N.W.2d 518, 518–19 (Mich. 1961). 
147 In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole II), 9 P.3d 409, 451 (Haw. 2000) 
(requiring long-term planning to protect the public trust); see also Kelly v. Oceanside 
Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1002–03 (Haw. 2006).  
148 N.J. Dept. of Env’t. Prot. v. Dimant, 51 A.3d 816, 830 (N.J. 2012).  
149 Cf. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, 889 F.2d 1146, 1154 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(minimal connection required under CERCLA). 
150 See, e.g., Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Ct. of S.F. County, 119 Cal. 
App. 4th 28, 38 (2004).  
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circumstantial evidence of causation.151 Nevertheless, the added 
burdens and delays in a public nuisance case are other reasons to 
proceed under a public trust theory.  
IV 
COMMON LAW IS ALWAYS EVOLVING 
“Continuity and change are essential attributes of a legal system.”152 
Public trust law enjoys these attributes and is no different from other 
common law doctrines: “[t]he public trust doctrine, like all common 
law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should be 
molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the 
public it was created to benefit.”153 Public trust law dates back to the 
Romans154 and continues to evolve at common law155 to meet the 
contemporary challenges of pollution and limited resources. The 
advent of public law enactments is not a reason to halt the evolution of 
the public trust, or to eliminate it entirely, but rather to allow it to 
develop in that new legal context in light of the changing societal 
values driving those enactments156: 
[T]he law should be based on current concepts of what is right and
just and the judiciary should be alert to the never ending need for
keeping its common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient
distinctions which make no sense in today’s society and intend to
discredit the law should be readily rejected.157
As the Matthews court said, “Archaic judicial responses are not an 
answer to a modern social problem.”158 For example, New Jersey’s 
natural resource restoration program is grounded in the public trust 
151 See In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65, 116 (2d Cir. 2013) (market share 
evidence); see also Rhode Island v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 357 F. Supp. 3d 129, 140 (D.R.I. 
2018) (national trend away from traceability and toward market share evidence). 
152 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3 (1982). 
153 Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 
1972). 
154 J.B. Ruhll & Thomas A.J. McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine: What Was It, 
and Does It Support an Atmospheric Trust? 47 ECOLOGY L. Q. 117, 117 (2020). 
155 Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae and the Attorney General 
as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 57, 62 
(Fall 2005). 
156 See Allan Kanner, Future Trends in Toxic Tort Ligation, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 669, 690–
91 (1989).  
157 McDonald v. Mianeck, 398 A.2d 1283, 1291 (N.J. 1979) (quoting Schipper v. Levitt 
& Sons, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (N.J. 1965)). 
158 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (1984) (quoting Borough 
of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d at 54.). 
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doctrine, which originates from a body of common law159 providing 
that “public lands, waters and living resources are held in trust by the 
government for the benefit of its citizens,”160 and has been enhanced by 
statute:161 the New Jersey Spill Act.162 The Spill Act identifies the 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as the trustee of the 
State’s natural resources.163 Natural resources are broadly defined to 
include “all land, fish, shellfish, wildlife, biota, air, waters and other 
such resources owned, managed, held in trust or otherwise controlled 
by the State.”164  
159 When passing the Spill Act, the Legislature specifically, and for good reasons, 
reserved the common law as part of the State’s authority to protect the environment. N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11v (West 2020). The common law public trust Doctrine evolves 
“to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.” Borough of 
Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d. at 54. Accord McDonald, 398 A.2d. at 1291. It also serves as 
a gap filler when statutes come up short. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. ExxonMobil, 22 A.2d 
56, 58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
160 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:36-2.1 (2021); see also Dep’t of Env’t. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. 
Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other 
grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976); Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358. 
161 Spill Compensation and Control Act (“Spill Act”), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 
(West 2020); Water Pollution Control Act (“WPCA”), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-1 to -20 
(West 2020). Other states recognize the public trust as sufficient in that legislation to protect 
the public trust. State v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 820 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing state 
to recover for loss of fisheries habitat even absent a statutory provision allowing recovery, 
saying “the state, through the Department, has the fiduciary obligation of any trustee to seek 
damages for injury to the object of its trust.”). 
162 The Spill Act provides that one who is “in any way responsible for any hazardous 
substance” is strictly liable, upon its discharge, for “all cleanup and removal costs no matter 
by whom incurred.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(c)(1) (West 2020). Legislative history 
on the Spill Act phrase “in any way responsible” reveals that the Legislature added it in 
1979 when it amended the strict-liability provision to provide for joint and several liability 
under the Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(5) (West 2020). No longer was liability 
limited to those who were active participants in the discharge of hazardous substances. See 
Marsh v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 703 A.2d 927, 931 (N.J. 1997) (finding legislative intent 
to expand scope of Spill Act liability through 1979 amendments that hold strictly liable any 
owner or operator who was “in any way responsible” for discharge and citing, in support, 
N.K. Dep’t of Env’t. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N.J. 1983) (noting that 
while subsequent acquisition of property on which spill had occurred is insufficient to 
impose responsibility, one who owns or controls property at time of discharge is responsible 
party for Spill Act purposes)). N.J. Dep’t of Env’t. Prot. v. Dimant, 51 A.3d 816, 830 (N.J. 
2012). 
163 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11a (West 2020). 
164 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11b (West 2020). 
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V 
SUING TO ENFORCE 
The public trust is not self-executing, and the state must sue to 
enforce.165 “[I]f the health and comfort of the inhabitant of a state are 
threatened, the state is the proper party to represent and defend 
them”;166 since natural resources are part of the common public trust,167 
the state as trustee should sue for tortious interference. Public trust 
natural resources enjoy at least the same protections as private 
resources. Tort law, like the Spill Act, requires interpretations that deter 
misconduct and spur restorative actions.168 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly affirmed that the state is the trustee of environmental 
resources, which are held in trust for the benefit of the public.169 
Though governmental agencies routinely grant environmental 
management contracts to private organizations, the public beneficiary 
does not change nor does the government’s fiduciary duty.170 
Understandably, most public trust cases focus on the responsibilities of 
the state as a trustee for its people.171 The U.S. District Court for the 
165 Some state constitutions or statutes conferring standing on citizens allow private 
enforcement actions to protect the public trust or actions against state officials to compel 
them to enforce the public trust. Both topics are beyond the scope of this article. 
166 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901). 
167 See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).  
168 N.J. Dep’t Env’t. Prot. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 923 A.2d 345, 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2007). 
169 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 521 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); 
McCready, 94 U.S. at 391; Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855); Martin v. Waddell’s 
Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
170 See, e.g., Town of Fallsburg v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 633 (1991). 
171 The duties owed by a public trustee do not differ from those of a private trustee. 
Times of Trenton Publ’g Corp. v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 846 A.2d 659, 667 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d as modified sub nom., Times of Trenton Publ’g Corp. 
v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 874 A.2d 1064 (N.J. 2005). New Jersey courts have
adopted § 174 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which states that “[t]he fiduciary’s
obligations to the dependent party include a duty of loyalty and a duty to exercise reasonable
skill and care.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (AM. L. INST. 1959); see also
F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 704 (N.J. 1997); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 859
(N.J. 2002). The comments to § 174 of the Restatement of Trusts clarify that if the trustees
were selected because they have specialized knowledge or training, they will be held to that
standard of skill and care: “[I]f the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by
representing that he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a
duty to exercise such skill.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (AM. L. INST.
1959). In this instance, the Legislature, consistent with the established public trust doctrine,
has entrusted the public trust resources to the Plaintiffs based on their expertise. The
Legislature also instructed Plaintiffs to liberally construe the Spill Act to affect its purposes
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Eastern District of Virginia reaffirmed that “under the public trust 
doctrine, the [states] and the United States have the right and the duty 
to protect and preserve the public’s interest in natural wildlife 
resources. Such right does not derive from ownership of the resources 
but from a duty owing to the people.”172 Obviously, the state’s trustee’s 
fiduciary duties include the right to sue for injury to the public trust.173 
The specific common law tools available to the trustee to discharge its 




Trustees investigate natural resource injuries and determine 
appropriate remedies. This subject generally is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, it is worth noting public trustees may also recover for 
the defendant’s unjust enrichment.174 For example: 
In Wyandotte Transport Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that restitution was an allowable remedy for government, even 
though statutory penalties already applied. In Wyandotte, the 
government sued for the negligent sinking of a ship in a navigable 
river. The case can be considered a toxic tort because the sunken 
vessel contained chlorine. The court allowed the government to 
be reimbursed for the expenses of raising the ship and any 
cleanup involved, because statutory fines were “hardly a satisfactory 
remedy for the pecuniary injury which the negligent shipowner may 
inflict upon the sovereign. The court further added, “[d]enial of 
such a remedy . . . would permit the result, extraordinary in our 
jurisprudence, of a wrongdoer shifting responsibility for the 
consequences of his negligence onto his victim.”175 
of protecting the general health, safety, and welfare of the people of this State. N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 58:10-23.11x (West 2020). Plaintiffs, as trustees, therefore, have the authority to 
carry out the purpose of the public trust doctrine, i.e., to protect the State’s natural resources 
for the benefit of its citizens. 
172 In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980); see also Gary D. 
Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include Protection 
of Wildlife, 19 ENV’T. L. 723, 730 (1989). 
173 State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974) (Municipality 
liable for fish kill caused by its negligent discharge of sewage, saying liability is “an 
essential part of a [public trust] doctrine, the vitality of which must be extended to meet the 
changing societal needs.”) (emphasis added). 
174 See, e.g., Ohio v. Monsanto Co., No. A 1801237 (Hamilton Cnty., Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 
5, 2018). 
175 Allan Kanner, Unjust Enrichment in Environmental Litigation, 20 J. ENV’T L. & 
LITIG. 111, 151–52 (2005) (citations omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
The common law public trust doctrine is a dynamic and evolving 
doctrine. It is a “background principle” of property law.176 Historically, 
courts have cubbyholed such state claims to protect the public trust as 
a parens patriae action or public trust action for “public nuisance,” 
“trespass,” or “strict liability,” or ignored identifying the operative 
legal theory being used to enforce the public trust. In many ways, this 
jurisprudence invokes a formalism unsuited to the evolving public 
trust. The governing jurisprudence could be vastly improved by 
recognizing and evolving over time the cause of action for tortious 
interference with the public trust. The public trust provides a 
framework, integrated with applicable science and policy, to preserve, 
protect and help us restore our ecosystems.177 
176 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
177 See, e.g., Robin K. Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State 
Common Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 781 (2009).  
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